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For the purpose of testing uncovered interest parity (UIP), rates of
European currencies against the Mark offer a distinct advantage:
theadmissiblebandoftheExchangeRateMechanism(ERM)induces
statistically signiﬁcant mean-reversion in weekly rates. Thus, unlike
for freely ﬂoating rates, there is an expectation signal that has non-
trivial variation and is sufﬁciently traceable for research purposes.
When running the standard regression tests of the unbiased-
expectations hypothesis at the one-week horizon, we nevertheless
obtain essentially zero coefﬁcients for intra-EMS exchange rates
(and the familiar negative coefﬁcients for extra-EMS rates). Even
more puzzlingly, lagged exchange-rate changes remain signiﬁcant
when added to the regression, a feature that seems hard to explain
as a missing-variable effect. The deviation from UIP is signiﬁcant
not just statistically but also economically: trading-rule tests reveal
that for sufﬁciently large ﬁlters the average proﬁt per trade exceeds
transaction costs, and that cumulative gains can be quite impressive.
Thesizeoftheproﬁtsandthepatternsfrombuyversusselldecisions
also allow us to reject the hypotheses of either a risk premium or
peso issues about realignments as sufﬁcient explanations.
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In their review paper on the bias in the interest-rate differential as a predictor of exchange-rate
changes, Froot and Thaler (1990) end on a somewhat ambivalent note. Having documented the
widespread failure of the standard regression tests, they note that the amount of exploitable predict-
ability seems to be tiny, the uncertainty from taking advantage of the bias huge, and the proﬁts small.
Roll and Yan (2000) add that the signiﬁcance of the standard regression test is overstated because the
regressor has very long memory; taking into account the likely true standard errors, the classical
regression evidence becomes totally uninformative. We contribute to the debate in four ways. First,
we studya new sample: managed intra-European rates against the DEM instead of the usual USD rates.
This sample is unusual in that there is verystrong predictability in the exchange-rate changes, with R2’s
of 20–35%; yet our unbiased-expectations regressions do as badly as usual. Second, we offer statistical
evidence that does not suffer from long-memory problems and strongly rejects unbiased expectations.
Third, we show that the proﬁts from trading on reversal are huge and the risks are small. In an average
year we would be bearish, bullish and neutral about equal amounts of time, and given a buy or sell
signal we’d have conditional annualized returns of about 20%, netting us about 14% p.a. extra. In
addition, the risk is low, which provides us very high Sharpe ratios. Lastly, none of the standard rational
theories seems to be able to explain a bias that behaves like ours, swinging from hugely positive to zero
or hugely negative in a matter of days. In short, we think the bias is not a marginal phenomenon, and
remains as challenging as ever.
The background is as follows: the forward bias is a long-standing puzzle in international ﬁnance:
the forward premium or interest-rate differential between two currencies systematically mispredicts
future exchange-rate changes, and does so by far more than conventional risk theories predict.3 Fama
(1984) infers that there must be a missing variable – possibly a risk premium – whose variation over
time must be even larger than the time-series variance of these conditional expected changes.
It is, however, not always obvious how momentous some of these ﬁndings are. For example, Fama’s
moment condition can be met by a missing variable that merely consists of misalignments too small to
matter relative to trading costs, combined with expectations that hardly change over time. In the same
vein, Froot and Thaler (1990) argue that the expected proﬁts are economically small, especially relative
to the residual uncertainty. Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) ﬁnd that the negative association between
forward premium and realized exchange-rate change may be a 1970s–1980s OECD phenomenon; in
wider and more recent data the picture looks better. De Grauwe (1989) adds that the negative
coefﬁcients disappear when the base currency is not the USD. Lastly, the statistical signiﬁcance of
the ﬁndings is, at best, unclear: Roll and Yan (2000) show that the near-unit-root characteristics of
the forward premium invalidate the usual standard deviations, and Schotman et al. (1997) document
a similar phenomenon related to thick tails and outliers in the regressor.
In this paper, we study a new data set, viz. 1985–1998 weekly changes in exchange rates against
the German Mark. In Section 1 we document a non-trivial short-run predictability of exchange rates
created by afﬁliation to the European Monetary System’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), whether
this afﬁliation be a formal membership like for the Guilder or a market-perceived loose association
as for the Swiss Franc. If Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) holds, the forward premium should pick up
this strong predictability. However, our results from standard UIP regression tests on one-week Mark
data are not substantially better, and in a sense even worse than in other data sets, as Section 2
shows. First, in our Cumby–Obstfeld–Fama (henceforth COF) regression tests of UIP the slopes for
European monies are still far from unity, and very sensitive to data period and estimation technique.
Second, the autocorrelations are not affected by the introduction of the forward premium as a regres-
sor – evidence that positively contradicts UIP, is hard to explain as a missing-variables problem, and
does not suffer from a near-unit-root effect. Even more interesting is the economic signiﬁcance of
these combined phenomena (predictable rates, and un-aligned forward premia): the trading-rule
3 The seminal papers are Cumby and Obstfeld (1984) and Fama (1984); Froot and Thaler (1990) offer an excellent early
survey; Holliﬁeld and Uppal (1997) bring up a general-equilibrium analysis predicting a small bias; Bansal (1997) shows the
bias may be large and asymmetric. The more recent kernel-based models are discussed in the concluding section.
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over and above the average risk premium, turn out to be a few hundred percentages, in one case
even reaching 600%. The total size and the details of the returns then allow us to conclude, in
Section 4, that none of the usual suspects is likely to be singly and fully responsible for such a result.
Rather, we need at least a combination, possibly reinforced by a more subtle pricing effect (like the
transaction-cost-induced hysteresis features stressed by Baldwin (1990)), or a market inefﬁciency. In
short, we think the puzzle has deepened: the amount of money left on the table was quite easy to
spot and uncannily large.
Our results are different from earlier work on forex technical trading4: we study managed rates not
ﬂoating ones (against the Mark rather than the dollar) and, accordingly, the trading rule is based on
reversal rather than momentum. There are also a number of papers that, like ours, are more UIP-
focused when testing trading rules, but their buy or sell decisions arebased on the risk-freerates rather
than on exchange-rate forecasts.5 As, in the short and medium run, interest rates are largely
independent of expected exchange-rate movements, picking high-yield currencies does pay. But our
exchange-rate-related signals are more frequent and more proﬁtable than yield-based ones.
2. Predictability in intra-European exchange rates
The data we start from are daily and weekly London exchange rates against Sterling (GBP)6 and
one-week spot interest rates, both from Datastream (midpoint Barclays quotes, or for USD/BEF,
National Westminster quotes). There is nothing unusual in our results for the BEF, so the source seems
to have little impact. Our data cover almost 13 years, starting in 1985/6/1 (the date where Datastream’s
coverage is expanded) to 1998/4/1 (the date Euroland rates became quasi-ﬁxed). In our tests, these GBP
rates were re-expressed into DEM per unit of foreign currency. This must have introduced small
deviations relative to simultaneous quotes made immediately in DEM, but it is hard to see how this
could have inﬂuenced the outcome of the tests in any signiﬁcant way.
The 10 resulting exchange rates against the DEM are mostly European: four core-ERM currencies
(BEF, DKK, FRF, and NLG) and three intermittently or informally associated with the ERM (CHF, ITL,
and as the weakest afﬁliate, GBP).7 To verify whether the ﬁndings are indeed typical for European
exchange rates we also include three major outside currencies (USD, JPY, and CAD).
Exchange-rate changes against the USD are commonly accepted to exhibit a slight but statistically
clear positive autocorrelation, leading to the proﬁtable momentum-based trading results cited in the
introduction. For ERM-member rates, tied to each other by a narrow band, one naturally expects
also cross-correlations: currencies that for some reason did not follow the pack immediately must
catch up later. In exploratory research that led to this paper we studied daily data against the USD,
and found large cross-correlations among ERM-member rates, and weaker cross-links with quasi-
members. These links are signiﬁcant for one- and two-day lags, but rarely beyond that. Also, we found
that, from the USD point of view, the DEM was the bellwether currency, with the other European
currencies following the DEM’s movements against the USD, partly with a lag. Switching data to
a DEM basis, we accordingly expect reversal rather than continuation patterns. We indeed found clear
negative autocorrelations at lags 1 and 2 for ERM-member rates, and traces of negative autocorrelation
for the other European currencies. These results are available on request.
4 For results from daily data see Levich and Thomas (1993), Neely et al. (1997), Sweeney (1986), Taylor (1994), and Surajaras
and Sweeney (1992). For weekly data see Kho (1996). Okunev and White (2003) use monthly data. Intraday data do not seem to
work, see Neely and Weller (2003) and Raj (2000).
5 The seminal article is probably Robinson and Warburton (1980); see also Green (1992), who also uses the inﬂation rate, and
LeBaron (1998) or Villanueva (2005).
6 GBP¼Great Britain, Pound; USD¼US, Dollar; BEF¼Belgium, Franc; DEM¼Deutschland, Mark; DKK ¼Denmark, Crown;
FRF¼France, Franc; NLG¼Netherlands, Guilder; CHF¼Confederatio Helvetica (Switzerland), Franc; ITL¼Italy, Lira;
CAD¼Canada, Dollar; JPY¼Japan, Yen.
7 Although the Swiss central bank denies intervention, the CHF is widely seen as informally linked to the DEM and, now, the
Euro. The ITL was an ERM member but with an unusually wide band. The GBP unilaterally tracked the ECU in 1990–1991 as
a prelude to formal ERM membership, in the spring of 1992, but dropped out in September 1992.
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fact that for most currencies Datastream offers no long histories of one-day spot interest rates from
which forward premia can be reconstructed;8 but coverage of spot one-week rates is adequate.
Thus, inTable 1 wedocument alsothe autocorrelationpattern for one-week exchange-rate movements
rather than one-day returns, ﬁrst estimated in the regular simple way (‘‘OLS’’), and then taking into
account the substantial ﬂuctuations in uncertainty (‘‘GARCH’’, using a GARCH(1,1) variance model
and an AR(1) mean equation). We observe strong autocorrelations at lag one for the ﬁrst four curren-
cies, the ERM core members, many times larger than their standard deviations, and basically no
autocorrelation for the other currencies. We also look at subperiods: the period before September
1992 with a narrow ERM band and many formal realignments, the turbulent September 1992–
December 1993 period, and the more quiet wide-band period as of 1994 that ended in the ﬁxed rates
for Euro-currencies. The negative autocorrelations remain clearly present in the ﬁrst and last
subperiods. Unsurprisingly, in the turbulent transition period they are less pronounced, statistically
as well as economically. Note that for the ITL, with its wide band, the autocorrelations are weaker,
but for core members the coefﬁcients are large not just statistically but also economically, with
averages in excess of  0.20 and individual cases up to  0.50. We conclude that there was a substantial
predictability in daily as well as weekly exchange-rate changes.
3. Regression tests of UIP, weekly data
3.1. Standard tests
According tothe UIP hypothesis, expectedexchange-rate changes should be offset bydifferentials in
the interest earned, or, equivalently, by the forward premium.9 Formally, the hypothesis is
Et 1ð~ stÞ¼FPt 1, where ~ st denotes [St  St 1]/St 1, the simple percentage change10 in the exchange
rate, and FPt 1 denotes the forward premium set at time t 1 for delivery at t.11 A familiar test is to
run the Cumby–Obstfeld–Fama (COF) regression of exchange-rate changes on forward premia, possibly





¼ k0 þ k1FPt 1 þ k2Xt 1: (1)
The UIP hypotheses predict k0¼ 0¼k2 and k1¼1.
One simple test is to derive an unconditional version of Eq. (1), which can then be tested by a cross-
sectional regressionwith, as the left-hand side variable, mean realized rates of change in the spot rates
computed from long time series and, as the regressor, long-term mean forward premia. Whenwe do so
in our smallish database (10 currencies,13 years) we ﬁnd an OLS slope coefﬁcient of 0.57 and an R2 ðR2Þ
of 0.42 (0.35). Larger databases – Lothian and Wu (2005) even look at two centuries of data – usually
provide a slope that is closer to unity. So in the long-run, static buy-and-hold strategies seem to have
similar payoffs across currencies, with capital gains by and large offsetting low interest rates and vice
versa.
8 Overnight and/or tomorrow/next interest rates are sometimes available, but in daily tests we’d need one-day spot (that is,
second/third working day) because spot forex is delivered on the second working day.
9 In the computations we computed forward premia from LIBOR interest rate, the rates against which also banks set their
forward premia.
10 We use simple percentages because asset pricing theory makes predictions about prices or simple percentage changes
therein. Statements about logs can be made only at the cost of unnecessary and unrealistic additional assumptions like lognor-
mality. We are aware of Siegel’s paradox. But the paradox serves to remind us that UIP cannot be true, and trying to lessen its
empirical impact does not seem desirable to us.
11 The time subscripts reﬂect the moment the variable is known: t for s, and t 1 for FP or for the risk-free rates for invest-
ments between times t 1 and t. In the exposition, we use the terms ‘‘forward premium’’ and ‘‘interest-rate differential’’ inter-
changeably. In the tests we compute forward premia using one-week LIBOR rates – the banks’ standard – taking into account
the two-working-days delivery rule in spot and forward markets, the 365-days-per-year convention for GBP and (pre-1999) BEF
interbank money markets, and the 360-days-per-year convention for other currencies.
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in Section 3, do generate spectacular return differences across currencies. But also regressionwise the
picture already changes substantially if we test Eq. (1) as a set of time-series relations. In Table 2 we
summarize our results for Eq. (1) on weekly data against the DEM. We use OLS and two system
estimators, Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) assuming normality and constant moments,
and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), using all 10 forward premia and 10 lagged changes as
instruments. Estimates are provided for the entire data set and for each of the three subperiods deﬁned
before, except for GMM where the second subperiod is too short to handle 210 moment conditions.
Since the forward premium is almost a unit-root process, the regular t-tests vastly overstate the
signiﬁcance; so our (two-sided) probabilities against H0: k1¼1 are obtained from the Lagrange
multiplier test, a statistic which fares much better in the Bekaert and Hodrick (2001) experiments
on UIP tests. But our main conclusions do not rest on just this statistic. One alternative test is a signif-
icance check on the results of a trading rule, see Section 3. But another test is already possible within
the current regression framework: add st 1 an additional regressor Xt 1 in Eq. (1). There is no unit-root
problemwith thesevariables; the standard deviationfor its coefﬁcient,k2, is givenin theheaderof each
panel in the table.
In terms of the slope coefﬁcient for the forward premium, the picture is qualitatively not better than
in the extant literature despite the predictability we just documented. True, in Panel A of Table 2 there
are some promising averages: at 0.71, the mean OLS slope for the forward premium is rather good. But
the median slopes are already substantially lower than the simple averages, and the two system
estimators tend to come up with much lower slopes. Upon closer inspection, the positive equation-
by-equation slopes are entirely due to the tumultuous middle period, where the size of the estimates
is, in fact, bizarre. In the larger subsamples (Panels A2 and A4), negative slopes dominate, and the
recent ﬁgures are worse than the early ones. The evidence from the COF coefﬁcients is, in short, not
reassuring: DEM-based test results do not provide any better support for UIP, and there is no
improvement over time either.
While we observe no clear difference between intra-European versus other rates in Panel A, there is
a sharp divide in Panel B, where ERM members still show massive negative ﬁrst-order autocorrelation.
The standardt-testfor this variable is reliable, and most coefﬁcients remain signiﬁcanteventhough the
forward premium has been added as a regressor. Also algebraically the k2si nTable 2 are strikingly
similar to the r1si nTable 1. Thus, forward premia do not at all pick up the predictability inherent in
the negative autocorrelation of s. The signiﬁcance of the lagged changes is puzzling: the predictability
Table 1
First-order autocorrelations, weekly
Et 1ð~ stÞ¼k0 þ r1~ st 1
Autocorrelation coefﬁcients r1 for individual currencies Averages
BEF DKK FRF NLG CHF ITL GBP JPY CAD USD ERM Other
Total period (1985/6–1998/3), s(r)¼0.039
OLS * 0.28 * 0.15 * 0.17 * 0.48  0.03 0.11 0.01  0.01 0.01 0.02  0.22 0.03
GARCH * 0.38 * 0.22 * 0.11 * 0.44  0.00  0.01 0.01  0.01 0.04 0.01  0.23 0.01
Early ERM (tight band, 1985/6–1992/8), s(r)¼0.052
OLS * 0.36 * 0.30 * 0.13 * 0.51  0.03 0.03 0.00  0.03 0.03 0.01  0.26  0.01
GARCH * 0.39 * 0.28 * 0.17 * 0.52 0.02 0.12  0.01  0.04 0.00  0.01  0.27 0.01
September 1992–end 1993 (turbulence, 1992/9–1993/12), s(r)¼0.12
OLS 0.02 0.01 * 0.24 * 0.45 0.02 0.13 0.04 0.02  0.08 0.08  0.13 0.04
GARCH  0.21 0.01 * 0.26 * 0.32  0.00 0.13 0.07 0.08  0.21 0.04  0.16  0.02
Late ERM (wide band, 1994/1–1998/3), s(r)¼0.066
OLS * 0.39  0.09 * 0.17 * 0.26  0.08 0.11  0.03  0.13 0.09  0.01  0.20 0.01
GARCH * 0.42 * 0.18 * 0.16 * 0.26  0.05  0.08  0.03  0.13 0.11  0.01  0.21  0.03
The variables st are weekly percentage changes in the exchange rate against the DEM. Autocorrelations are estimated using OLS
and GARCH(1,1) speciﬁcations for the variance. The averages shown are for the ﬁrst and second sets of ﬁve currencies,
respectively, labeled somewhat inaccurately ‘‘ERM’’ and ‘‘other’’. Standard deviations are shown in the panel headers, and an
asterisk denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level (one-sided).
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Cumby–Obstfeld–Fama tests of UIP
Et 1ð~ stÞ¼k0 þ k1FPt 1 þ k2~ st 1
Coefﬁcients for individual currencies Central values
BEF NLG DKK FRF ITL CHF GBP JPY CAD USD Avg Med
Panel A: COF slope coefﬁcient (k1)
A1. Total period (1985/6–1998/3)
OLS  0.05  0.18 0.38 0.69 1.17  0.33 2.07 0.30 0.26 2.75 0.71 0.34
p (lm) 0.77 0.90 0.82 0.93 0.96 0.77 0.71 0.87 0.79 0.52
FIML  0.34  0.36 0.17 0.46 0.32  0.33 0.97  1.06  0.48 1.95 0.13  0.08
p (lm) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.25 0.04 0.87 0.10 0.00 0.26
GMM  0.11  0.59 0.27 0.38 0.53  0.38 1.57  0.56 0.10 2.08 0.33 0.18
p (lm) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01
A2. Early ERM (tight band, 1985/6–1992/8)
OLS  0.37  0.33  0.21 1.71 0.38  0.44 0.80  3.96  1.90  0.42  0.47  0.35
p (lm) 0.76 0.92 0.78 0.89 0.87 0.77 0.97 0.42 0.48 0.70
FIML  0.58  0.67  0.28 1.49 0.17  0.28  0.62  4.42  1.48  0.96  0.76  0.60
p (lm) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.09
GMM  0.46  0.75  0.17 1.33 0.28  0.41 0.93  4.52  1.37 0.30  0.49  0.29
p (lm) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.16
A3. September 1992–end 1994 (turbulence, 1992/9–1993/12)
OLS 1.74 2.48 0.89  2.42 9.31  12.53 3.44 57.92 9.06 63.30 13.32 2.96
p (lm) 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.79 0.40 0.81 0.84 0.21 0.83 0.08
FIML 0.57  0.62  0.04  3.78 7.13  3.81 5.35 19.29  5.43 12.10 3.08 0.27
p (lm) 0.80 0.71 0.19 0.00 0.20 0.62 0.12 0.21 0.25 0.24
A4. Late ERM (wide band, 1994/1–1998/3)
OLS  1.11  1.55  4.31  2.35  5.52  3.90  7.23  19.06  2.66  7.20  5.49  4.10
p (lm) 0.94 0.95 0.77 0.76 0.46 0.84 0.29 0.52 0.65 0.30
FIML  2.18  1.85  4.18  2.22  4.15  2.71  1.74  23.64  5.08 0.31  4.74  2.47
p (lm) 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.35 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.80
GMM 0.07  1.63  4.28  2.12  5.30  3.57  6.80  17.82  2.58  6.79  5.08  3.92
p (lm) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Averages
ERM Other
Panel B: Autoregression coefﬁcient (k2)
B1. Total period (1985/6–1998/4), s(k2)¼0.039
OLS * 0.28 * 0.48 * 0.16 * 0.18 *0.10  0.04 0.01 0.01  0.01 0.02  0.20 0.00
FIML * 0.29 * 0.43 * 0.17 * 0.21 0.08  0.03 0.02 0.02  0.01 0.02  0.20 0.00
GMM * 0.28 * 0.45 * 0.16 * 0.17 0.09  0.02 0.01 0.00  0.01 0.02  0.19 0.00
B2. Early ERM (tight band, 1985/6–1992/8), s(k2)¼0.052
OLS * 0.35 * 0.51 * 0.30 * 0.14  0.03  0.03 0.00  0.05 0.03  0.01  0.27  0.01
FIML * 0.35 * 0.46 * 0.29 * 0.12 0.01  0.03 0.04  0.02 0.04 0.02  0.24 0.01
GMM * 0.33 * 0.48 * 0.29 * 0.14  0.03  0.04 0.02  0.03 0.04 0.02  0.26 0.00
B3. September 1992–end 1993 (turbulence, 1992/9–1993/12), s(k2)¼0.12
OLS 0.01 * 0.44  0.05  0.22  0.09  0.03 0.06  0.12 0.03 0.08  0.16 0.01
FIML  0.13 * 0.39  0.09 * 0.31  0.06 0.05 0.08  0.04  0.04 0.05  0.20 0.02
B4. Late ERM (wide band, 1994/1–1998/3), s(k2)¼0.066
OLS * 0.39 * 0.27  0.14 * 0.18 0.09  0.09  0.05 0.09  0.14  0.02  0.18  0.04
FIML * 0.37 * 0.25 * 0.16 * 0.16 0.05  0.10  0.02 0.07  0.09 0.01  0.18  0.02
GMM * 0.39 * 0.26  0.13 * 0.18 0.09  0.09  0.05 0.08  0.13  0.02  0.18  0.04
The regressands st are weekly percentage changes in the exchange rate against the DEM, the regressors are the beginning-
of-period one-week forward premium (FPt) and the lagged regressand. The estimation methods are OLS, Full Information
Maximum Likelihood (FIML; normality, constant moments), and Generalized Method of Moments (GMM; 2 10 instruments).
The p values are two-sided and based on the Lagrange multiplier test. The two central values shown in the rightmost columns
are, in Panel A, the mean and the median for k1, and in Panel B, the means of k2 for the ERM core currencies (BEF, NLG, DKK, FRF,
CHF, the latter an informal member) and the non-ERM ones, respectively.was easy to spot, there are statistical doubts about the signiﬁcance, and it is hard to imagine a risk
premium that always mirrors the AR(2) prediction.
3.2. Tests on ‘‘extreme’’ observations
One potential explanation of the poor results is that, because of transaction costs or risk premia, the
forward premia are noisy estimators of the true conditional expectation, creating the standard errors-
in-the-regressor bias towards zero. To attenuate this, Nissen (1997) and Huisman et al. (1998) look at
subsamples where forward premia are large, hoping that for these observations the expected changes
are unusually large, too.12 If so, the better signal-to-noise ratio should increase the COF regression
coefﬁcients back towards unity.











k1 þ l1IðPÞt 1
 
FPt 1: (2)
In Eq. (2), the indicator I(P)t 1 equals unity if, on day t 1, the forward premium is ‘‘large’’, that is,
belongs to the top P% of the ranked observations, with P being set equal to 40, 20,10, or 5%; otherwise,
I(P)t 1 equals zero.13
Table 3 provides the crucial results. These are weakly in line with the hypothesis in the sense that
6–8 of the 10 coefﬁcients are positive in the large-FP sample, against 4–6 in the modal-FP sample.
Likewise, seven or eight of the estimated differences (k1) have the right sign, positive. But only one
positive difference is signiﬁcant (ITL), and in the 60/40 split the CHF goes the wrong way. Nor do we
see larger differences the more unbalanced the split is. True, there is such a pattern in the mean k1,
but this is entirely due to the bizarre outlier for the USD; the median does not conform to the hypoth-
esis. Results for GARCH, not shown, are even less in favor. Thus, the simple errors-in-variables-like
effect Nissen or Huisman et al. had found in their monthly data against the USD are not strongly
present in our numbers.
4. A trading-rule test
If intra-ERM ratesare toa non-trivial extentpredictable and one-week interestratesdo notpickthis
up,averagereturns fromtradingmust be positive,at least beforetransaction costs.To discoverwhether
the potential gains are large, before and after costs, we formally test a trading rule. Ideally, we would
like to take transaction costs into account at every trade. While Datastream provides bid–ask rates,
these are indicative quotes whose spread substantially overstates the spreads in any individual market
maker’s binding quotes and a fortiori overstates the difference between the market’s best bid and ask.
To still obtain an approximate answer to the question whether the returns exceed the two-way costs,
we keep track of the number of trades and compute the average before-cost proﬁt per trade, as
described in the next section. This average proﬁt per trade can then be judged against the limited
information we have about transaction costs.
4.1. The trading rule
The purpose of this section is not to ﬁnd the optimal trading rule, unlike many of the papers cited in
the introductory section. Rather, we want to show that even the simple linear relation picked up in our
UIP tests provides informationwith clear economic signiﬁcance. The fact that more sophisticated rules
would have done even better just reinforces that point.
12 See Sercu and Vandebroek (2005) for the distributional characteristics of expectations v noise required to make the tech-
nique work.
13 Huisman et al. work with panel data and a restriction of equal betas across currencies. Their high/low criterion is, accord-
ingly, based on the ranked dispersions of the forward premia within each cross-section. We do not follow their approach as, in
our sample, the cross-currency constraint is rejected.
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the DEM tend to exhibit negative ﬁrst- and second-order autocorrelation. The linear trading rule that
tries to measure the potential gains from this phenomenon is implemented in calendar time14 and
works as follows: we take the DEM as the home currency. Using two years of past data, we estimate
the ﬁrst- and second-order partial correlation coefﬁcients. Periodically these estimates are updated
using the most recent 2-year sample. At any date t 1, then, our contrarian forecast for the next-day
change will be a partial reversal of the recent changes:
 
st   c FPt 1
 
¼ r 1ðst 1   FPt 2Þþr 2ðst 2   FPt 3Þ: (3)
Whenever the predicted net return against the DEM is positive and larger than a pre-set ﬁlter f,w e
receive a ‘‘buy FX’’ signal; likewise we get a ‘‘sell FX’’ message whenever the predicted movement is
more negative than  f.
We consider three (related) trading rules, the ﬁrst of which is a ‘‘pooled’’ trading rule, that is, one
where both buying and selling are possible. Under this rule, upon a ‘‘buy’’ signal we go long foreign
exchange (FX) and short DEM; after the ‘‘sell’’ recommendation we switch to long DEM and short
FX; and when there is neither a buy nor a sell signal we do nothing.15 Formally, in the pooled trading
rule we set Db,t 1¼1 whenever there is a buy recommendation and 0 otherwise, and we likewise set
Ds,t 1¼  1 whenever there is a sell recommendation and 0 otherwise. Returns on long and short po-
sitions are cumulated separately, in accounts indicated by subscripts A (asset) and L (liability). In the
Table 3
Tests of UIP on extreme versus modal FPs
Et 1ð~ stÞ¼½ k0 þ l0IðPÞt 1 þ½k1 þ l1IðPÞt 1 FPt 1:  
 
Coefﬁcient Regression coefﬁcients for individual currencies Central values
BEF NLG DKK FRF ITL CHF GBP JPY CAD USD Avg Med
Split at the 60th percentile
k0  0.06  0.13 0.14  0.15  3.64 7.04 0.18  2.00 4.49  1.95 0.65 0.44
k1  0.19 0.29 0.09 1.00 5.47  7.57 2.47 3.02  5.33 3.77  0.08 0.36
p (lm) 0.87 0.88 0.90 0.36 *0.01 *0.02 0.35 0.41 0.06 0.56 0.43 0.40
k0þk1  0.25 0.17 0.24 0.85 1.83  0.53 2.66 1.02  0.84 1.83 0.57 0.80
Split at the 80th percentile
k0  0.69 0.00 0.15  0.10  2.01 1.10 1.74  1.77 1.05 2.26  0.06 0.27
k1 0.09  0.51 0.07 1.52 4.03  1.43 0.91 3.75  1.74 2.69 0.74 1.03
p (lm) 0.93 0.73 0.91 0.14 *0.00 0.45 0.68 0.19 0.50 0.66 0.50 0.47
k0þk1  0.59  0.51 0.23 1.42 2.03  0.33 2.65 1.98  0.69 4.95 0.69 1.30
Split at the 90th percentile
k0  0.60  0.74 0.11 0.05  1.49 0.27 2.05  0.08 0.62 0.09 0.02 0.10
k1  0.02 1.95 0.37 2.88 3.23  0.60 1.40 2.37 0.24 67.79 1.31 8.84
p (lm) 0.99 0.24 0.59 *0.01 *0.02 0.71 0.62 0.42 0.94 0.19 0.51 0.42
k0þk1  0.61 1.21 0.48 2.93 1.74  0.33 3.45 2.29 0.85 67.87 1.33 8.94
Split at the 95th percentile
k0 0.16  0.45 0.03  0.03  1.17  1.84 1.83 0.15 0.70 1.04  0.07 0.03
k1  1.36 1.95 0.67 4.47 4.76 2.26 1.45 3.87  0.78 76.97 1.92 10.62
p (lm) 0.26 0.32 0.35 *0.00 *0.01 0.27 0.73 0.31 0.82 0.43 0.34 0.36
k0þk1  1.21 1.50 0.69 4.44 3.59 0.42 3.28 4.01  0.08 78.01 1.85 10.65
The regressands (st) are weekly percentage changes in the exchange rate (against the DEM), the regressors are the beginning-
of-period one-week forward premiums (FPt). The intercept and slope coefﬁcient are allowed to differ depending on whether
the premium is extreme or modal, i.e. whether jFPj belongs to the P% highest of the ranked jFPj, where P¼5, 10, 20, 40%. Esti-
mation is by OLS; p values are from the Lagrange multiplier test.
14 See Bjerring et al. (1983) for the difference between event-time and calendar-time studies.
15 It can be veriﬁed that, in the equations below, ‘‘doing nothing’’ is shown as holding DEM both long and short, so that the net
return is zero. We need this seemingly Byzantine twist for the annualization, infra, where both the long and short sides need to
be fully invested all the time.
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tively; note how, each day, the Ds activate either an FX or a DEM position. The last equation deﬁnes
the net return (NR) as the return from the long account minus the return from the short account:
RA;t ¼ Db;t 1
 
st þ r 





1   Db;t 1
 
rt 1; where Db ¼ f0;1g; (4)
RL;t ¼
 
1 þ Ds;t 1
 
rt 1   Ds;t 1
 
st þ r 
t 1 þ str 
t 1
 
; where Ds ¼f 0; 1g; (5)
NRt ¼ RA;t   RL;t ¼
 
Db;t 1 þ Ds;t 1
   
st þ r 
t 1 þ str 
t 1
 
  rt 1
 
; (6)
where rt 1 (rt 1 * ) is the one-day return on a DEM (FX) money-market investment and between dates
t 1 and t and st the percentage exchange-rate change over the same period. We recognise
[(stþrt 1 * þstrt 1 * ) rt 1] as the return, measured in DEM, on a one-day FX investment, in excess of
the DEM return; multiplying by (Db,t 1þDs,t 1), this excess return is ‘‘weighted’’ by þ1 in case of
a buy signal,  1 in case of a sell, and a zero in case of no signal.
We also want to test whether the gains are symmetric. For this purpose we test a separate ‘‘buy’’
strategy, one where Ds,t 1 always remains zero (that is, upon bad news we liquidate a long FX position
but we never actually shortsell FX); and we likewise implement a ‘‘sell’’ strategy where Db,t 1 is never
switched to unity: upon a buy signal we stop shortselling FX (if we were short at all) but we never
actually go long FX. These one-directional results are relevant to a liquidity trader, who is typically
interested in a transaction of a particular type. But these results can also provide insights related to
the forward puzzle, and more speciﬁcally whether peso-type problems connected with possible
realignments are likely to have been a major factor or not.16 Given the reputation of the home currency,
the DEM, for ERM members only one type of parity change is conceivable: a devaluation of FX. Peso-
type realignment risk, if any, should show up especially after a ‘‘buy FX’’ signal (which follows a drop of
FX), and less after a ‘‘sell FX’’ signal because then the FX has picked up, recently. In short, a positive
difference between the average ‘‘buy’’ and ‘‘sell’’ returns would be consistent with an extra peso-
type realignment risk for ERM members.
4.2. Economic and statistical signiﬁcance measures
For the purpose of interpreting the average daily returns for various ﬁlters and currencies, it is
useful to correct for two obvious sources of differences in risk across currencies. First, the average
risk premium may differ between, say, ITL and NLG. Second, there can be substantial differences as
tothe times spent long and shorteach currency. We can correct for these byconsidering a static control
strategy. In this control strategy we take into account how much of the time the contrarian trader is
long or short by simply adopting a static strategy with the same average exposure and, therefore,
with the same risk premium, provided the latter is constant. Speciﬁcally, for each currency’s time
series of signals, DbþDs, we compute the average and then deﬁne a static control strategy where
we hold a constant position equal to Db þ Ds, instead of the time-varying one in Eq. (6). If our signals
are useless, in the sense of being uncorrelated with subsequent returns, then our trading strategy has
the same expected return as the control strategy. Formally, deﬁne the excess net return (XNR) as the
net return in excess of the net return on the control strategy:
XNRt ¼
  
Db;t 1 þ Ds;t 1
 
  ðDb þ DsÞ
    
st þ r 
t 1 þ str 
t 1
 
  rt 1
 
: (7)
The expected value is zero when the signal is uncorrelated with the subsequent net return:
EðXNRÞ¼cov½ðDb þ DsÞ;ðs þ r  þ sr    rÞ : (8)
16 A peso risk, in the original, narrow sense, is a huge potential event with a very small probability. The event is so huge that it
affects the true expectation, but the probability is so small that the researcher often does not observe the event and, therefore,
mis-estimates the expectation. More generally, peso risk refers to deviations between ex ante and ex post distributions.
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signiﬁcance of a covariance or a simple regression coefﬁcient. Speciﬁcally, one regresses the net return
(sþr*þsr* r) on the trading signal (DbþDs). This test can be done separately for the pooled, buy, and
sell rules. We use OLS with Newey–West’s corrected t-statistics.
The above tests bear on mean excess returns per day. To judge the economic signiﬁcance we
complement this in two ways. First, to see whether returns are sufﬁcient to recover transaction costs,
we compute average returns per run of signals of the same sign. Second, to assess the likelihood of
competing explanations of the forward puzzle, we cumulate the returns over long periods and
compute p.a. returns. The details are as follows.
In the ﬁrst variant we compute the average return per run of consecutive signals D of the same sign.
Thus, in computing this average, we assume that the trader does not automatically close out at the end
of each day, but waits until the signal either becomes zero orchanges sign. Withina given run of similar
signals, the returns on the long and short sides are cumulated separately17 and the net value is
computed at the end of the run. To the speculator, this average return per run is more relevant than
the average return per buy or sell day since the speculator probably can hold positions longer than
one day and incurs the costs only once.
In the second variant we cumulate the returns over long periods and compute p.a. returns. Again,
returns on long positions are cumulated separately from returns from short positions, and we compute
the ﬁnal net value as













For each strategy, the p.a. average net return is obtained by computing average returns for each of the
legs separately:














v u u t ; (10)
where N is the time between starting date t1 and end date tn measured in years rather than trading
days. The p.a. excess return then is computed as the above net return minus the analogous net return
on the static control strategy.
4.3. Risk-free investments
As mentioned, in Datastream the one-day spot rates are unavailable for most of the period. We use









    1; (11)
where it,tþ7 is a p.a. simple interest rate for a 7-day investment (LIBOR, in practice); and following
interbank conventions: ND equals 365 for BEF or GBP, and 360 for other currencies. The numerator
and denominator show the values, on days tþ1 and t, of a CD that has 7 days to go on day t. To imple-
ment this, we need to assume that itþ1,tþ6¼itþ1,tþ7, which, traders conﬁrm, is acceptable. True, there
may have been a Hicksian maturity risk premium associated with holding seven-day paper instead
of one-day; but recall that the control strategy would also beneﬁt from any such premium so that it
would be largely neutralized in the excess net return.
While we would have been happier with perfect data, it is reassuring that the results turn out to be
robust to this approximation. In an exploratory run, for instance, we simply took Datastream’s
17 Directly compounding the net returns, or a fortiori excess net returns, would be hard to interpret since there is no
implementable strategy that provides this cumulative payoff.
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three-month rates) and found essentially the same results. Indeed, the picture hardly changes even if
we set all rates equal to zero. (These results are available on request.) The reason for the near-
irrelevance of interest rates is their independence of exchange-rate changes, plus the fact that, via
the control strategy, any maturity-related bias largely disappears.
4.4. Empirical results
Table 4, Panel A shows total-period p.a. netexcess returns and t-tests on the average daily netexcess
return, for variousvalues of the ﬁlter. Wealso providemeans forERM and non-ERMcurrencies. Thereis
a classiﬁcationproblemwith the CHF (not a member, but widely viewed as de facto pegged) and the ITL
(a member, but with a much wider band). Somewhat arbitrarily, we put the CHF into the ERM-group
and the ITLnot.This is conservativeinthe sense that it blurs thedifferencesbetween the subsamples;it
also avoids the hindsight-selection bias that would have arisen from grouping just the four strictly-
ERM currencies that, in the end, all turned out to stay in the system or even merge with the DEM.
We note that across all ﬁlters the returns are unanimously positive for the continental currencies,
while they are patchy and algebraically small for the other currencies. The returns are systematically
signiﬁcant for core-ERM currencies, most of the time also for the CHF and ITL, but never signiﬁcant for
the GBP and the control group in the strictest sense (CAD, JPY, USD). It clearly pays to decrease the ﬁlter
from 10 bp to 5 bp or even 1 bp, but further reﬁnements no longeradd anything substantial. The trading
rule produces rather impressive excess returns: the ERM-group average for the 1 bp rule is 14%, and in-
dividual-currency results range between 8 and 19% (between 300 and 650% cumulative over eleven
years,18 that is). But even the widest ﬁlter,10 bp, still pays out a respectable excess average return of 8%.
To verify the intertemporal stability and internal validity of the results, and to further reduce
potential problems of heteroskedasticity, we run all tests also on subperiods, using again the tranquil-
lity-versus-turbulence criterion. To preserve space we just show these subperiod results for the worst-
performing ﬁlter, 10 bp. The summary is in Panel B of Table 4. Despite the much smaller sample sizes,
only one cell loses its signiﬁcance rating (CHF in the ﬁrst period). The numbers remain in remarkable
agreement with the total-sample results: almost unanimously clear and positive returns per subperiod
for the core-ERM currencies, less impressive but positive returns for the CHF and ITL, and essentially
random results for the GBP and the control currencies JPY, CAD, and USD. For the other ﬁlters the
results are generally stronger but otherwise show the same patterns across currencies and periods.
In Panel C of the table we check whether the proﬁts stem mostly from the long positions, or the
short ones. Results for the 0.5- and 0.1-bp ﬁlters, being too similar to the 1-bp results, are omitted.
It turns out that the returns from the buy-only and sell-only rules are quite comparable. Each is
signiﬁcant in its own for the core-ERM members, often so for ITL and CHF, and never so for the outside
currencies. Judging by t-tests, the difference between buy and sell is never signiﬁcant at the 1-% level
except in one case (out of 18 – i.e. three trading rules six continental currencies).
19
From these buy- or sell-only results we conclude that, for liquidity traders whose transaction costs
are irrelevant, there would have been substantial gains from using the trading rule. Of course, being
cumulative returns before transaction costs, the net excess payoffs reported in Table 4C are represen-
tative only for liquidity traders that have to do a transaction every day (and of a similar size every day).
To provide an idea of the proﬁtability in a more general situation, Table 5 reports the mean proﬁt per
run and per signal for various ﬁlters, and for the best- and worst-performing ﬁlters also the subperiod
results. We see that the large ﬁlters, which produced the lowest p.a. net excess returns, actually provide
the highest proﬁts per signal; thus, in terms of cumulative returns the problem with the large ﬁlters
obviously is that there are not enough of these trading opportunities. The issue is whether these
average returns per trade exceed the transaction costs is reserved for the concluding section.
18 We have 13 years of data but lose two in estimating the ARIMA model.
19 True, another case is almost signiﬁcant (with t¼2.07), but both the signiﬁcant and the almost-signiﬁcant ts occur for the
same currency, the NLG; and if we want to cite this as evidence of peso-type problems connected with realignments, then the
NLG, commonly regarded as a DEM clone, is surely the least convincing candidate.
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Excess p.a. returns for all ﬁlters
Coefﬁcients for individual currencies Averages
BEF NLG DKK FRF CHF ITL GBP JPY CAD USD ERM Other
Panel A: Pooled (buy and sell), total period (1985/6–1987/3)
f (bp) 10 bp 9.44 10.4 8.42 9.94 2.19 1.3  0.18 3.49 0.76  0.92 8.08 0.89
t-Test *12.61 *11.03 *10.23 *16.81 *3.33 0.97  0.16 1.12 0.64  1.17
5 bp 15.1 13.35 10.12 13.29 3.51 4.41 0.9 4.13 0.1 1.47 11.07 2.20
t-Test *16.54 *12.55 *10.08 *17.45 *3.93 *2.64 0.50 0.98 0.08 1.04
1 bp 19.35 15.11 11.9 15.62 8.72 6.46 0.28 2.14 1.17 3.83 14.14 2.78
t-Test *16.71 *12.19 *9.35 *16.05 *6.78 *3.20 0.09 0.43 0.42 1.60
0.5 bp 19.20 15.61 12.44 15.78 8.48 5.74  1.05 3.63 1.34 4.11 14.30 2.75
t-Test *16.54 *12.55 *10.08 *17.45 *3.93 *2.64 0.50 0.98 0.08 1.04
0.1 bp 19.26 15.28 12.49 15.75 9.48 5.14  2.9 5.11 1.73 4.12 14.45 2.64
t-Test *15.82 *11.38 *9.21 *15.23 *6.50 *2.38  0.90 0.92 0.56 1.46
Panel B: Pooled (buy and sell), three subperiods, f¼10bp
smpl 1985– 8.84 11.42 4.09 6.63 0.56 0.02  0.15 5.19 0.72  0.10 6.31 1.14
t-Test *5.15 *7.92 *5.85 *11.60 0.69 0.17  0.12 1.30 0.50  0.29
1992– 15.65 28.09 18.20 23.52 1.36 9.83 6.61 18.04 5.84 3.85 17.36 8.83
t-Test *8.58 *8.62 *8.25 *10.86 *4.42 *6.06 1.09 1.25 1.06 1.24
1994– 8.31 5.71 8.49 8.54 3.27 0.01  1.80  1.05  0.41  2.49 6.86  1.15
t-Test *10.01 *4.69 * 6.50 *10.05 *3.16 0.04  1.41  0.26  0.27  2.28
Panel C: Total period, buy versus sell, various ﬁlters
rule 10buy 4.68 6.07 4.52 5.00 1.28 0.68  0.56 2.23  0.62  0.77 4.31 0.19
t-Test *7.85 *8.14 *7.65 *13.32 *4.24 0.65  0.66 1.24  0.71  1.60
10sell 4.76 4.32 3.89 4.94 0.91 0.61 0.39 1.26 1.38  0.15 3.76 0.70
t-Test *11.12 *10.94 *8.51 *13.83 1.72 1.14 0.39 0.40 1.64  0.47
tb s  0.11 2.07 0.84 0.12 0.61 0.06  0.72 0.27  1.65  1.07
5buy 8.13 7.74 5.41 6.85 2.08 2.83  0.17 3.44  1.35 0.95 6.04 1.14
t-Test *12.61 *10.00 *8.26 *14.62 *4.03 2.25  0.08 1.51  0.93 1.17
5sell 6.97 5.61 4.71 6.44 1.43 1.58 1.07 0.69 1.44 0.52 5.03 1.06
t-Test *13.58 *11.64 *9.02 *15.36 *2.39 2.23 0.85 0.10 1.09 0.45
tb s 1.29 0.91 0.98 1.36 0.73 1.08  0.04  0.01 0.19 0.28
1buy 10.23 7.99 6.43 8.30 4.73 4.09  0.15  0.59 0.86 2.19 7.54 1.28
t-Test *16.04 *10.79 *8.73 *15.47 *6.77 *3.24 0.01 0.00 0.64 1.69
1sell 9.12 7.12 5.48 7.31 3.99 2.37 0.44 2.74 0.31 1.64 6.60 1.50
t-Test *15.86 *11.74 *8.78 *14.81 *5.50 *2.45 0.16 0.82 0.12 1.10
tb s 1.41 *2.34 0.84 0.65 0.82 0.87  0.50 0.38  1.42 0.30
We use daily data, June 14, 1985 to April 1, 1998 with the DEM as reference currency. A buy signal (D¼1) occurs whenever the
exchange-rate change, as predicted by the AR(2) equation, exceeds the ﬁlter size, and likewise for the sell signal (D¼ 1). On
D¼1(  1) we go long FX (DEM) and short DEM (FX), while on D¼0 both the short and long side are DEM. Returns are from
holding a 7-day DEM or FX risk-free investment for one day. In the control strategy, we follow a static rule of always investing
D units (where D is the average position for that currency over the entire sample period). The t-tests are on the mean net return
(long minus short) per day in excess of the net return from the trading strategy, and an asterisk indicates signiﬁcance at 1% one-
sided. The daily returns themselves have been compounded and annualized. The two average returns in the rightmost columns
are computed over the ﬁrst and second sets of ﬁve currencies, respectively. Subperiods are (i) is until September 1, 1992; (ii)
September 1992 till end 1993; (iii) as of 1994. In the third part of the table, signals D¼ 1 are set to D¼0 in the buy-only
rule, and signals D¼1 are set to D¼0 in the sell-only rule. The rule ‘‘10buy’’ refers to a buy-only game with ﬁlter 10, and so
on. The t-test on the difference between the buy and sell returns is indicated as tb s.
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strategies.20 We provide three versions, one using simple mean–variance optimisation in combining
the ﬁve currencies’ trading rules, and two that followa naive weighting scheme. In the ﬁrst go, we start
from the time series of net returns, as deﬁned in Eq. (6), on each of the pooled time series for the ﬁve
‘‘ERM’’ currencies; we compute the variance–covariance matrix U and the vector E of ﬁve mean
excess returns, and identify the mean–variance optimal weights w5 1 ¼ U
 1E
J0U
 1E for a fully invested








Table 6 provides these Sharpe ratios for each of the three ﬁlters (10, 5, and 1 bp), along with the
weights for each of the ﬁve currencies. The weights are all below 0.5 and (up to one minor exception)
positive; that is, our ratios are not driven by extremely large positive and negative positions, a feature
that plagues many applications of the Sharpe criterion. The NLG is the most desirable currency, it
seems; the BEF, despite its higher forward premia, is too risky to come ﬁrst, but still beats the FRF
and DKK.
Table 5
Average Abnormal Returns per run and per signal, subperiod results for the largest and smallest ﬁlters
Filter Strategy BEF DKK FRF NLG CHF ITL GBP USD JPY CAD
Panel A: average proﬁt per run, %
0.100 Buy 0.20 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.19 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.08
Sell 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.12
0.050 Buy 0.17 0.19 0.15 0.17 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.07
Sell 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.03
0.010 Buy 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02
Sell 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01
0.005 Buy 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01
Sell 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01
Panel B: average proﬁt per signal, %
0.100 Buy 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.12 0.07
Sell 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.11
0.050 Buy 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.06
Sell 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.03
0.010 Buy 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01
Sell 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00
0.005 Buy 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00
Sell 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01
There is a buy signal (D ¼1) whenever the absolute value of the exchange-rate change, as predicted by AR(2), exceeds the
ﬁlter; and there is a sell signal (D ¼1) when the predicted return is below minus the ﬁlter. The trade, if any, is a one-
working-day forward sale or purchase depending on the sign of the predicted change. The table shows average excess
returns (AERs) per trade and per run, for strategies where both selling and buying is allowed (‘‘pooled’’), as well as for
strategies with either just buying or just selling. The AERs are averages of gross returns over the entire period (June 14,
1985–April 1, 1998), in excess of the return from a static trading strategy consisting of always buying forward D units (where
D is the average position over the entire sample). For the AER per signal we assume that the trader liquidates every day. For
the AER per run we assume that when a signal D is followed by another one of the same signs, then the trader rolls over her
position until the run of identical Ds is ﬁnished.
20 We followed up on this suggestion because of the ratio’s popularity among practitioners. Theoreticians may, correctly, ob-
ject that it should be applied just to total-wealth returns, not to a small part of one’s wealth. Also, our portfolio returns are far
from normal, with an especially anomalous probability peak at the zero return as the main source of non-normality, and right-
skewness as the second one.
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sets of ratios based on naive equal-weighting schemes.21 From Table 6 we see that the alternative new
return/risk ratios do not drop very far from the level obtained after ex post mean–variance optimisation.
5. Discussion and conclusion
Froot and Thaler (1990) advance three possible explanations of the forward bias: a regular risk
premium, peso risk, and learning. We review these in light of the new evidence, along with a fourth




by episodes like this one. In the case of the ERM, more speciﬁcally, there was no pronounced shift in
monetary policy. Also, the systemwas well known by the time our data start, so there was little to learn.
The regular risk premium is a covariance with a stochastic discount factor which, in turn, is usually
speciﬁed as the return on a portfolio or a combination of portfolios. We ﬁrst focus on the risk premium
as speciﬁed by the standard CAPM or its international version (InCAPM). In these models the portfolios
are, in case of the CAPM, the market portfolio and, for the InCAPM, a combination of the world market
and the various countries’ T-bills. In the CAPM, the spot rate’s beta can never be large because the R2 of
an exchange-rate market-model regression is invariably tiny22 and the regressor standard deviation
larger than the regressand one:
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Sharpe ratios and ex post m–s-optimal weights
Filter 10 bp 5 bp 1 bp
Mean–variance optimal portfolios
wBEF 0.27 0.31 0.28
wDKK 0.14 0.12 0.11
wFRF 0.13 0.10 0.09
wNLG 0.46 0.49 0.49
wCHF 0.00  0.02 0.04
m–s optimized Sharpe ratio 0.35 0.43 0.46
Equal-investment portfolios
Naive Sharpe ratio 1 0.32 0.37 0.40
Naive Sharpe ratio 2 0.30 0.39 0.41
Foreach ﬁlter size we start from the time seriesof netreturns, as deﬁned in Eq. (6), on each of the pooled time series for the ﬁve ‘‘ERM’’
currencies. From these ﬁve series we compute the variance–covariance matrix and the vector of ﬁve mean excess returns, fromwhich
we identify the mean–variance optimal weights for a fully invested portfolio.Thisprovidesameanexcessreturn,astandarddeviation,
and a Sharpe ratio. Under the ﬁrst alternative scheme, on every day the trader invests equal amounts (say, DEM 1) in each ‘‘active’’
currency, that is, the weights are wi,t¼Db,i,tþDs,i,t; a position in the DEM money market is then added so that the total net investment
i sD E M1 .T h i sp r o v i d e sa ne x c e s sp o r t f o l i or e t u r nf o re v e r yd a t e ,f rom which the mean, the standard deviation, and the Sharpe ratio








zero, and wi,t¼0 otherwise; the DEM money-market account then again serves to bring the sum of the weights up to unity.
21 In a ﬁrst implementation, every day the trader invests the same total amount (say DEM 1), and allocates also equal amounts
(DEM 1) in each currency. That is, the risky weights are wi,t¼Db,i,tþDs,i,t, and a position in the DEM money market is then
added so that the net investment is DEM 1. This generates a realized excess portfolio return for every date, from which the
mean, the standard deviation, and the Sharpe ratio follow. In this version, the total risk of the portfolio changes drastically
over time, as the number of active positions can vary from zero to ﬁve. To test the robustness to this effect, we consider a second





if at least one position is non-zero,
and wi,t¼0 otherwise; the DEM money-market account then again serves to bring the sum of the weights up to unity. The mo-
tivation is that this scheme provides a ﬁrst-pass correction for the ﬂuctuating number of active positions.
22 See for instance, Allayannis (1996) for a review.
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Thus, with such a small beta, even if the risk premium on the market would be 10 or 20% we would
never get anywhere near a 14-% average for an exchange rate.
Actually, we need to explain not just the 14% extra, but also the fact that 7.5% is obtained from being
long and 6.5% from being short, with positions changing quite rapidly and lasting one or two days.
Obviously, in the CAPM logic this requires a time-varying beta. It turns out that the required swings
in beta are too large to be credible. For the 1-bp ﬁlter, for instance, one is long about 37% of the
time, short about 29%, and out of the market 34%. (These are averages across the ﬁve ERM currencies.)
Thus, to get 7.5% from being long or out of the market – the buy rule – one needs about a 20%
annualized return on days one receives a þ1 signal. Similarly, to get 6.6% from the sell rule in 29% of
the time, the annualized extra return on negative-signal days must be over minus 22%. While betas
can and do change over time, it is hard to imagine that the characteristics of two economies would
change so fast, so drastically, and so often, that CAPM-equilibrium expected returns swing from þ20
to  20% p.a. in a matter of days.
If the CAPM cannot explain an average excess return of 15%, might the InCAPM do so? In the two-
country version an own-variance risk premium is added (Sercu, 1980):
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where rw is the world-market return; Ai (Aw) is relative risk aversion for the country-i (world) investor;
and Wi (Ww) is country i’s (the world’s) invested wealth. But again it is implausible that returns of 10 or
20% p.a. would be explained by the new risk premium: the consensus is that relative risk aversion
exceeds unity, making the additional risk premium negative. In addition, a variance cannot change
sign, so in the InCAPM the variation in the last term should have come from the 1 A term, requiring
investors to swing quickly from strongly risk-preferent to highly risk-avert in a matter of days.
More generalized asset pricing model works with pricing kernels, which can specialise into
marginal utilities, consumption growth rates or market returns depending on the additional assump-
tions. (See e.g. Brandt et al., 2006; Brennan and Xia, 2006; Dai and Singleton, 2002; Inci and Lu, 2004;
Ahn, 2004). If, in such a setting, the market is complete, then the exchange rate must equal the ratio of
the marginal utilities Vc abroad versus at home.23 This implies a relation, shown below, between the
exchange-rate change and the percentage changes in the marginal utilities. But the expectation
percentage growth in marginal utilityequals (minus) the risk-free rate, in each country. The ﬁnal result
















  rss  dt þ s2 dt;
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 ð r dt   r  dtÞ¼  rss  dt þ s2 dt; (13)
where s (s*) is the p.a. standard deviation of the domestic (foreign) price kernel and r their
correlation. All moments could be changing over time, so it is plausible that the difference between
the two second moments ﬂips from positive to negative. Still, it remains puzzling why the difference
of the two moments would shift from þ20 to  20% p.a. in a matter of days. There is a second
contradiction: Brandt et al. (2006), inferring properties of kernels from stock markets, ﬁnd that
they do not ﬁt exchange rates in the sense that exchange rates should be even more volatile than
they already are, to be consistent with market completeness and stock-market behavior. As they
23 This version assumes Von Neuman–Morgenstern investors; the ﬁnal result does not strictly require this, however; the
percentage changes in the marginal utilities can be replaced by kernels as they emerge from a no-arbitrage condition.
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study.
De Roon et al. (2000) advance the idea of hedging pressure. They extend the CAPM with non-




si þ r 
i   r
 
¼ biEðrm   rÞþAwcovðei;rnÞ;
where ei is the residual of the regression of s on rm, and rn is the return on the aggregate position in
non-tradeable assets k¼1, ., K held by the private investors, that is, rn ¼
PK
k¼1ðqkpk=YmÞrk with
qk (pk) the beginning-of-period quantity (price) of non-tradeable asset k as held by all investors taken
together, rk the return on the non-tradable asset, and Ym the beginning-of-period total invested
marketable wealth. De Roon et al. stretch the Mayers model somewhat and look at positions of active
professional traders in related currencies rather than positions of the aggregate private investor.24 The
attractive part of this interpretation is that professional traders’ positions qk can change sign over time
indeed, and quite fast. But the covariances obtained by De Roon et al. are of the order of 0.10–0.25%.25
Thus, to explain a 15-% return as a reward for bearing covariance with non-tradeables risk, the product
of Aw and qkpk/Y would have to be of order of magnitude of 60–150, which is impossible.
A last potential explanation in the literature is the peso effect. Peso problems in the wider sense are
present in any empirical study involving expectations and second moments; for instance, we have not
observed a collapse of the Maastricht agenda, even though this scenario must have been part of the ex
ante distribution. Our discussion of peso-type risks here is restricted to the more narrow issue of
realignments and especially devaluations. These are a priori not likely to explain the near-zero slopes
for intra-European rates. For one thing, while there must have been more-than-occasional episodes of
realignment fears in the sample period, such realignments have actually occurred fairly frequently.
Also, they were small, ex post: Sercu and Uppal (1995, pp. 364–365) report an average devaluation
jump size of 4%. Nor can one argue that individual ex ante jumps might have been much bigger: the
understanding in the ERM was that a devaluation should just undo the cumulative change in the
real rate since the previous realignment. Thus, the idea that 14% is the product of a small probability
times a huge jump size is utterly implausible.
A second way to refute peso issue about realignments explanation is based on the observation that
our COF regression coefﬁcients for non-European rates are at least as bad as the ERM ones. If this is to
be explained by peso risk, the ﬂoating-rate data would have to be more exposed to that risk – but it is
hard to conceive what type of catastrophic event could occur in the case of ﬂoating rates. Third, if peso
risk is present, it should have shown up in our trading-rule results: going long FX after it has dropped
should be the positionwith comparatively more peso risk, not going long DEM aftera rise of FX. That is,
the returns from buy-only should exceed those from sell-only. While this algebraically true, the
observed differences are pairwise insigniﬁcant, and never amount to more than a fraction of the 14%
we have to explain away.
Our work also responds to claims that the gains are small and risky, and wiped out by transaction
costs. For a committed exporter or importer who is trading very frequently, judicious exercising of the
option to postpone a purchase or a sale would increase revenue by several percentage points. Detailed
subperiod results (available on request) show that the trading rules never produced negative payoffs
over any two-year interval. To further illustrate this point, we compare our Sharpe ratios to what could
be obtained in the stock market. Like ours, the benchmark ratio we use is fully in-sample. Speciﬁcally,
we look at a comparable trading strategy, implemented in Ang and Bekaert (2004), who consider
various national stock markets and try to determine, for each country’s market, which of two regimes
24 The most important non-tradable asset for individuals would be human wealth. Other important assets that are difﬁcult to
trade include appliances or furniture, etc. and, in many countries, real estate; housing is, in addition, often indivisible and there-
fore difﬁcult to diversify. But it is again hard to see how the exchange rate would have strong (and erratically ﬂuctuating) cor-
relations with returns from human wealth, white goods, and real estate.
25 The regression coefﬁcients in their Table III, Panel D are or order of magnitude 1. To obtain the covariance one needs to undo
a multiplication by 100 (see key to their table), scale up from a bi-weekly to a p.a. basis (i.e. multiply by 25) and multiply by
var(s), a number below 0.01 p.a.
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¼ 0:067 per diem. For our trading rule, the ratios ranged between 0.30 and 0.46 per
diem, 5–6 times better than the best ratio obtained in an exceptional stock-market decade.
Let us, ﬁnally, address transaction costs. An exchange rate is quoted in at least four digits (think of
a below-par EUR/USD) and often in ﬁve digits (like the USD/DEM, of old). In the mid-1990s, binding
quotes for USD/DEM were about three ticks apart, and the market spread between best bid and best
ask was occasionally as low as two or one tick (Lyons, 1998;s e eRosenstreich, 2005; Weithers, 2006).
Assuming, conservatively, a market spread of three ticks and a DEM-per-USD rate of 15,000 ticks, the
two-way cost was at most 2 bp. Of course, our data include lower-volume currencies, too, but 6 bp is
about the maximum for the rates we look at. Interest spreads should be added, but they are compara-
tively tiny. Even a spread of 25 basis points per annum, which for a long time was the norm, translates
into an implicit commission of just 25/2/360¼ 0.035 basis points (not percentages!) for a one-day spot
deposit.
From Table 5 it is unclear whether the small ﬁlters would have been proﬁtable to round-trip specu-
lators, but the larger ﬁlters, which pay off 10–25% per trade, have been proﬁtable even after transaction
costs. Thus, one cannot claim that transaction costs would have wiped out the gains we have observed.
Is the only remaining explanation, then, a market inefﬁciency, especially in light of the fact that
gains exceed the transaction costs? Baldwin (1990) argues that it is not. Speciﬁcally, he points out,
the observed return differentials should clearly exceed the costs before the arbitrageurs would
rationally move in. True, the holder of DEM has the option to shift her funds into FX as soon as the
expected total return on FX exceeds the return on DEM. However, she will normally wait until that
option is sufﬁciently far in the money. The ﬁrst reason is one that holds for ordinary options, too:
the holder of an American-style option will not exercise as soon as it is in the money by a minute
amount, but will wait until the payoff is big enough: immediate exercise would kill the (roughly)
50% probability that the exercise valueincreases overthe nexttime interval, and the gains frommoving
deeper into the money outweigh the losses from moving back towards the money. The second reason
for delayed exercise is that, if and when the investor has shifted her funds into FX, still sooner or later
the return on DEM is bound to become more attractive again. But due to the transaction cost, she will
then have to livewith below-normal returns on FXuntil the loss is sufﬁciently big towarrant switching
back to DEM. In short, to trigger trades, the return differential has to compensate for the transaction
cost of moving into and out of FX, plus the possible regret from moving in too soon, plus the likely
cost of reaping below-normal returns before moving out again. Whether this type of reasoning is
enough to explain the non-disappearance of trading proﬁts is far from certain: Baldwin’s thoughts
are far from an operational test or trading rule. Still, the jury is still out on whether or not transaction
costs justify inaction to the extent we have witnessed in our data.
We conclude with a brief wrap-up. One issue that hampers tests of UIP is that the market’s
expectations are unobservable. In this paper we are able to identify clear non-zero expectations
from the exchange-rate data themselves, for the simple reason that the ERM (or perceived dirty
ﬂoating) induces statistically signiﬁcant mean-reversion in daily and weekly exchange rates against
the DEM. UIP hypothesizes that this predictability should be picked up by the one-week forward
premium, but when running the Cumby and Obstfeld (1984), Fama (1984) regression tests of the
unbiased-expectations hypothesis at the one-week horizon, we obtain essentially zero coefﬁcients
for intra-ERM exchange rates (and the familiar negative coefﬁcients for extra-ERM rates). These slopes
are also quite unstable across estimation methods and periods. Lastly, lagged exchange-rate changes
remain signiﬁcant when added to the regression, that is, forward premia seem to essentially ignore
this source of predictability in exchange rates. Especially this last ﬁnding seems damaging to UIP:
the mean-reversion is quite simple to detect, the lagged change is not at all a near-stationary regressor,
and the idea that, over time, the risk premium would perfectly mirror the lagged changes looks far-
fetched. Nor can one maintain that the phenomenon is economically trivial. We indeed test a trading
rule, and ﬁnd that for a sufﬁciently large ﬁlter the average proﬁt per trade is larger than transaction
costs. The size of the proﬁts and the patterns from buy versus sell decisions allow us to reject the
regular risk premium and the peso hypotheses too, at least as being sufﬁcient in themselves to explain
P. Sercu et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 27 (2008) 1284–1302 1300the results. To ﬁgure out whether all this implies a market inefﬁciency, however, we need more insight
into the effect of transaction costs on optimal trading.
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